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Introduction 
 
After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the breakdown of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), Central and Eastern Europe was stroked by the 
instability that resulted in the social upheaval followed by a chain of partitions’ 
movements. The end of the Cold War division of Europe suddenly brought to central 
and eastern Europeans democracy, connected with freedoms and rights to which these 
people of former communist states were not used to. Some of these were freedom of 
people to voice their opinions and right for the self-determination as well (Rose, 
2000). Carment and James (1998) claim that in the absence of ideological framework 
caused by the fall of communism, then political leaders were given the advantage to 
readily mobilize the populations by the means of the stimulation of a sense of 
collective identity. Under those circumstances new and emerging issues take on an 
ethnic character and “dormant conflicts have come to the fore” (Carment and James, 
1997, 1). Rupeshinge (1990) and Internationaal Alert (1993) add to Carment and 
James’s statement by claiming that the replacement of communism by democracy has 
brought with itself side-effects such as  “upsurges in rampant ethno-populism, 
replacement of elites, or the shattering of fragile democratic institutions” (James and 
Carment, 1997, 1; Rupesinghe 1990; International Alert 1993).  
 
Considering both things may explain an alternation of war’s character after the post 
Cold War era, when we see the decrease of conflicts and wars between two states and 
an increase occurrence of the conflicts within states. The notable change also 
happened in the amount of secession movements and territories that aspired to part 
themselves from a common state within which they operated, as the number greatly 
increased.  Many of these aspirations for partition were accompanied by the rebellion 
against a state, numerous insurgencies, followed by bloodshed and atrocities, 
prolonged ethnic conflict, and even civil wars (Carment and James, 1998). Although 
each partition was and is a unique case, the majority of the state partitions turned 
violent. New York Times post from 7 February 1993 estimated the existence of 
approximately forty-eight ongoing or potentially violent conflicts in that year; 
“Romania, Mauritania, Rwanda-Burundi, Senegal, Togo, Nigeria, Kenya, Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, Algeria, Egypt, China, Bhutan, Brazil, Mexico, India, Kosovo” (New 
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York Times, 7 February 1993) and the Republic of Macedonia, East Timor, India, 
Yugoslavia (Bartkus, 2009). In the first part of the 90s there were over five thousand 
minorities, circa eighty ethnically oriented protracted conflicts in the world and thirty-
five internal wars under way in 1994 (Gurr, 1994). 
 
Despite the fact that partitions are not new phenomena in the international realm, the 
majority of states nonetheless do not succeed to part their territory without any 
atrocities, bloodshed or casualties being left behind. The world obviously still did not 
learn its lesson. We need to further study the partitions, especially now in times of 
such a globalized world where all countries are interconnected and the arousal of 
violence could bear a spillover effect. There are only a few cases when the people of 
lands aspiring for their independence succeeded to part themselves in a peaceful 
manner. Those cases where not one person loses their life are sadly rare. This calls for 
the attention and realization of a need to keep studying peaceful partitions until there 
are mechanisms created that will assure a peaceful process of these partitions. The 
partition of Czechoslovakia in 1993 is one of those special cases that can help us to 
draw the factors that facilitate to maintain peace during the partition.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to study the peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia, in 
particular the examination of the level of accommodation of its political elites, as of a 
complementary factor to the other factors that contributed to its peaceful partition. 
The objective is to answer the Research Question that asks How come some countries 
are able to part peacefully and others not? What are the factors that contribute to the 
peaceful partition of the states?  
 
The topic is highly relevant taking into a consideration the fact that even nowadays in 
the 21st century countries still have problems to conduct the partition in a peaceful 
manner. There is still an absence of a comprehensive list of the necessary factors that 
could be used as a guideline for those countries that wish to part peacefully and 
prevent the outbreak of violence. Therefore the objective of my work is to help 
contribute to this list by testing one of the possible factors that help maintain the 
peace during state partition; the high level of elite accommodation. In my work I will 
argue that the high level of strength of elite accommodation during the Czechoslovak 
partition helped the partition to be conducted in a peaceful way. This will be 
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examined through the following indicators; the pace of the negotiations, the 
willingness of elites to compromise, the fragmentation of the political parties, and 
finally, the behavior and attitudes of the political leaders in Czechoslovakia during 
1990-1992.  
 
The work will be divided into the three main chapters. The first chapter will offer the 
literature review on the topic, the utilized theory and research design of the work. The 
second chapter will provide an historical overview on the relationship between 
Czechs and Slovaks. The third chapter will consist of the main body of the thesis that 
will comprise of 5 subchapters each analyzing one indicator. The last subchapter (3.5) 
will offer an alternative explanation to the peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia.  
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Literature Review  
 
A lot has been written about violent partitions and seccessions that led to the outbreak 
of violent conflict. Actually the majority of the research and scholars focus on violent 
cases rather than on peaceful ones (Horowitz 1985; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Petersen 
2002; Rose 2000; Kaufman 2006; Jenkins & Cottlieb 2007). Nevertheless, peaceful 
cases may provide a good guideline for other states facing secession movements, or 
countries that wish to dissolve their state, in a non-violent manner. Therefore the case 
of Czechoslovak partition presents itself as excellent study material of a peaceful 
partition. 
 
The main limitation of the literature on the Czechoslovak partition is that it focuses 
mainly on answering the question of why the partition took place (Kusý; Wolchik; 
Žák; Rupník), and how come the partition was conducted peacefully. Although some 
authors (Kopecký, Leff, Young, Žák) mention the factors that they state are the 
elements that all together created the fertile field for peaceful process of 
Czechoslovak separation (the history of good relationships; the clear demographical 
and geographical borders; the external factors; and others that will be mentioned later 
in this review) there still can be complementation. Bearing in the mind the still 
existence of many partitions or demands of partition and secession all over the world, 
as mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, there is still a need to further study the 
partition processes to draw a guideline that can help to the other countries facing this 
challenge, to part peacefully. There are some scholars that attempt to study the 
peaceful nature of this partition more in to the depth, like for example Leff and Young. 
Žák and Kopecký mention the factors only briefly, as they mainly focus on studying 
the reason of the Czechoslovak break up, and not the reason of the peace during this 
break up. Leff’s list of factors is almost complete and explains the reason why this 
partition was peaceful, but he explains the each factor only briefly. He also neglects 
the political elites within his list. It is however very important to conduct a more deep 
study of political elites, their behavior and the level of accommodation especially in 
the case of the Czechoslovak partition. It is because actually the political elites were 
the ones to decide upon the fate of the country and all its inhabitants. There is a need 
to examine whether the Czechoslovak elites adopted a special behavior, which had an 
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impact on the peace maintenance during the partition, so the model for the future 
attempts to part a state can be derived.  
 
The already presented factors gathered from the existing literature that implemented 
the peaceful Czechoslovak partition can be summarized into these following sectors: 
 
a., The external factors  
Leff (1996) offers as one of the factors that contributed to the Czechoslovak peaceful 
partition the external factor that appeared in Europe at the beginning of 90s; the war 
in Yugoslavia. Leff claims that the bloodshed and atrocities happening in Yugoslavia 
made the political elites of Czechoslovakia more aware of the negative consequences 
of unresolved disputes, and that pushed them to speed up the pace of the negotiations. 
The outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia certainly motivated the elites to conduct the 
partition in a manner that would avoid such an outbreak; however, it is questionable 
whether we can consider a 3 years long negotiation as quick. Therefore Leff does not 
provide a convincing explanation that would support his argument.  
 
b., Clear geographical an demographic division  
The second mentioned factor that facilitated the maintenance of the peace during the 
Czechoslovak partition was according to Leff (1996) and Kopecký (2000) the clear 
geographical division of the state along the national line. The fact that there was 
already clear division helped to prevent dragging disputes over the common land. An 
almost perfect demographical division helped prevent disputes on which land belongs 
to whom. Therefore, clear geographical and demographical division certainly was one 
of the major factors that together with the others helped to facilitate the peaceful 
partition of the state. 
 
c., The history of good relations 
Another of the necessary factors presented by Leff is the good history of relations 
between Czechs and Slovaks, which lacks the presence of any violent and bloody 
conflicts. Leff bases his argument by referring to the polls that indicate that Czechs 
and Slovaks neither hated, feared, nor disliked one another (Leff, 1996). We can agree 
that a past of good relations surely helps to create a base for common good 
relationships in the future that will ultimately assure the peace. However, if the peace 
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was sustained in the past, it does not inherently eliminate any chances that it will be 
sustained also in the future. There is always a first time for everything if the 
bargaining sides reach a stalemate over the crucial issues that may lead to the 
dramatic disputes.    
 
d., The characteristics of negotiations and power-sharing 
The fact whether the partition followed protracted constitutional and political disputes  
was estimated as one of the major determinants of peace during the partition by 
Robert Young (1997). The important positive impact on peace could also have a 
declaration presented by the land that desires to withdraw from the country. Informing 
of its intent might lower the risk to exacerbate the conflict that could result in violent 
escalation (Young, 1997). However his explanation is not convincing enough as the 
protracted negotiations are oftentimes caused by the difficulties to meet the 
agreements that accompany these negotiations. The problematic negotiations between 
the bargaining sides increase the odds for the arousal of the conflict which at the end 
may lead into a violent conflict. On the other side, quick and smooth negotiations are 
a greater guarantee for the sustainability of the peace. Therefore Young’s explanation 
is not convincing enough. The main mistake that Young commits is that he perceives 
the Czechoslovak case as a case of secession of Slovakia from the Czechoslovak 
federation and not as a case of partition of the federation. Another factor that he lists 
that is not very persuasive is the declaration of the seceding state of its intent to 
secede from the state which is not convincing enough to state that it helps to assure 
the peace. The sustainability of peace depends more on the reaction of the state and 
whether they are willing to let the part demanding the sovereignty go. If the part that 
bids for independence declares that they intend to secede, and the predecessor state 
rejects this demand, than the explanation is not satisfactory. Nevertheless, in general 
Young positively contributed to the study of the Czechoslovak peaceful partition, by 
presenting a quite wide scope of the possible common elements of peaceful partitions. 
The important one was the realization of the importance played by the reaction of the 
remnant state to the demands for sovereignty of an ethic group of a state. Young, and 
also Kopecký as well, mention that the lower the number of participants negotiating 
the agreement the chances for these negotiations to be conducted in the peaceful 
manner increased.  
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The main limitation of the literature on the Czechoslovak peaceful partition is that the 
majority of the scholars attempt to answer the question of why did Czechoslovakia 
break up? (Leff, Musil, Žák, Kopecký). Another one is that they oftentimes overlooked 
the important key factor that definitely deserves more attention regarding the study of 
why the peace happened during this partition. This factor is the reaction of the people, 
better said, acceptance of the state’s decision without opposing it by any means. The 
fact that the public did not the rebel against the state certainly helped to preserve the 
peace during the partition; despite the fact that the majority of inhabitants of both 
republics did not wish for the partition to take place. At the same time, as it is 
therefore evident that the partition was conducted solely by the elites, there is a need 
for a deeper and comprehensive study of the elite’s behavior on the peaceful nature of 
this partition. Neither of these scholars provides one.  
 
Political elites  
Although Kopecký and Žák mention the political elites, they mainly study the impact 
that these elites had on the partition itself. Although Kopecký mentions that the same 
consociational inheritance - which involved the low level of elite accommodation and 
the absence of a tradition of elite accommodation – led to the dissolution of the state, 
“rendered the partition of Czechoslovakia peacefully”. However, he does not provide 
a deep analysis which would show the connection of it to the peace. He does mention 
it as a factor that helped peaceful partition, but only very briefly, as he mainly focuses 
on the analysis of why the partition happened through the lance of theory of Lijphart’s 
consociational democracy. Although he provides a comprehensive explanation of why 
the state failed to continue to exist, he does not focus on the peace itself. Žák also 
mentions the absence of strong elites in Czechoslovakia that would be capable of 
sustaining the existence of a common republic; however he also just connects it with 
the dissolution of the state. Therefore the more exhausting explanation of how the 
political elites added to the peacefulness of this partition would be of much 
contribution to not only the studies of this particular partition, but also to the others.  
 
James and Carment (1998) do study the political elites and their impact on the 
partitions, but they especially focus their attention to the impact of the level of 
accommodation to the outbreak of ethnic violent conflict. They argue that the low 
level of strength of political elite accommodation increases the odds for the breakout 
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of violent ethnic conflict during the partitions. However as they focus on the study of 
why violence happens and not on the study of peace, nor do they test their theory on 
the case study of the Czechoslovak partition, I decided to contribute to their study and 
examine the impact of the level of the elite accommodation had on sustaining the 
peace during the partitions. Especially on what impact it had on the Czechoslovak 
partition in particular and consequently, to contribute to the necessary factors that 
were already determined by previous scholars on what facilitated this peaceful 
partition. Therefore I will aim to contribute to the existing literature on the 
Czechoslovak partition by filling the gap that consists of an absence of 
comprehensive study of impact of the level of elite accommodation on this partition.  
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1 Theoretical Framework and Research Design 
 
1. 1 Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework of my thesis will be derived from the theory presented by 
James and Carment (1998). In their work, James and Carment associate weak inter-
elite accommodation, or nonexistent accommodation in the society with higher 
chances of escalation of ethnic violence partition. However, as the dependent variable 
of my analysis is peace and its maintenance I will therefore adjust their argument to 
the study of peace. Deriving from their theory, I will assume that if weak or 
nonexistent elite accommodation is a condition that makes violence more likely to 
appear during state partition, than strong elite accommodation should stand as a 
condition which makes peace more likely to persist during state partition. It is because 
accommodative behavior of elites is characterized often by the presence of 
congruence and the willingness to compromise. The opposite of elite accommodation 
is an intransigence behavior and unwillingness to compromise. The accommodative 
behavior provides a fertile field for smooth and quick negotiations, easily met 
compromises and met solutions to any issues that need to be addressed. The elites’ 
behavior of being characterized by willingness to compromise is more likely to avoid 
the conflict, and therefore sustain the peace. This also assumes, that if the level of 
elite accommodation grows, the chances for the peace during the partition 
automatically increase too.   
 
“A long tradition of instrumental approached to ethnic conflict has established that 
political elites can play important roles in mobilizing masses and triggering conflict”. 
(Horowitz 1985, Weingast 1995) Eldersveld, Kooiman and van der Tak, argue that 
“the character of the relationships between and among elites in modern societies is, … 
central to the achievement of certain system goals – whether stability, policy change, 
effective elite-mass relationships, government efficiency, legitimacy, or political 
development” (Eldersveld, Kooiman & van der Tak, 1981, 3) Zahar (2001) argues 
that it is required that political elites yield to an intransigent opponent to the prospect 
of mutual intransigence, if the power-sharing is desired to work smoothly. The elites 
have a chance to maintain the equilibrium by two possible means; by compromising 
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or displaying the mutual intransigence. Although Zahar suggests that the best form of 
sustaining the system and avoid its demise is to compromise, especially on the issues 
that are crucial to system’s interlocutors (Zahar, 2001). Horowitz adds that many 
elites’ met compromises and efforts for accommodative policies are caused by the 
genuine efforts to avoid or at least reduce the risk of conflict escalation to its 
minimum. “These efforts typically flow from arrangements, such as coalitions of 
commitment or alliances, that have built-in incentives for conciliation” (Horowitz, 
1985, 578).  “A lot of the weight of arguments in favor of power-sharing rides on the 
elites’ willingness to compromise and their understanding/fear of the consequence of 
mutual intransigence” (Zahar, 2001, 14). 
 
Accordingly, from the above-mentioned puzzle I derive the following hypothesis: 
A Peaceful CSFR partition was facilitated by the high level of strong elite 
accommodation.  
 
The hypothesis will test the impact of the independent variable that is in this case the 
level of strength of elite accommodation to dependent variable; peace during the 
partition of CSFR. 
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1.2 Research design   
 
In my thesis I perceive elite in a way as defined by Eldersveld, Kooiman and van der 
Tak (1981) who define elites as “individuals recruited, selected, and presumably 
trained to make decisions for a society” (Eldersveld, Kooiman & van der Tak, 1981, 
1). The term elites include all the high officials of a state, starting from cabinet 
ministers to local officials. “There are two sets of actors of preeminent national 
importance- the higher civil servants and the members of Parliament. The relationship 
between them as much as their behavior and attitudes vastly influences the way in 
which the problems of society are being solved, the direction of the policy, as well as 
the degree of public support for government” (ibid.). The perception of elites as it is 
nowadays in modern world politics was created after 1870, when we observe the 
formation of two important set of elites of the national political system; the national 
bureaucracy consisting of civil servants and the leaders of political parties who hold 
control over the national legislative process. These two elites were of a great 
importance as they gave direction in which the modern policy evolved (ibid.). 
 
I will borrow a definition of elite accommodation by Lijphart who states that elite 
accommodation is based on the willingness of political elites to engage in 
“cooperative efforts with the leaders of other segments in a spirit of cooperation and 
compromise” (Lijphart, 1977, 37). The power of elites dwells in the inclusive 
decision-making and power-sharing of the state. By having an ability to access the 
state institutions, and by being given a responsibility to address national problems, 
elites are given the power to influence politics and the way in which the politics will 
be driven (Eldersveld, Kooiman & van der Tak, 1981). Problems during the 
negotiations can be caused by the composition of the leadership between two or more 
belligerent parts. The leadership of one may be composed predominantly of 
university-educated professionals, while leadership in another may be confided to 
traditionally oriented aristocrats. Good intentions will not necessarily be enough to 
establish points of contact and sympathy among elites whose backgrounds do not 
mesh” (Zahar, 2001, 565). However there is no guarantee that all leaders of ethnically 
divided societies aspire to promote an accommodation. There might be cases when 
conflict is more profitable for some leaders. At the same time policymakers are also 
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only participants in their societies and may bear adversarial and hostile sentiments 
toward the members of other groups. In any case, there is still a chance that these 
policymakers would see the ethnic conflict as necessary to advance the interests of 
their groups. “Even if political leaders do not hold such views, they may nonetheless 
benefit, politically and materially, from continuation of the conflict and be loath to 
pursue policies of amelioration” (Weiner, 1966, 564). On the other side, there might 
be a situation when the policymakers do aspire to promote an accommodation, 
however “their hands may be tied by the beliefs and interests of others: group 
members, voters, party supporters, colleagues, and bureaucrats, all of whom may have 
their own reasons for pursuing the conflict” (Weiner, 1964, 564). In any case, the 
political elites hold in their hands a great amount of power to influence; either 
positively or negatively; the society in which they operate through negotiations of 
interests of their groups. All these immensely determine whether they will pursue the 
accommodative polices or not. In my thesis, the peace during the partition is defined 
as an absence of violent conflict. 
 
The independent variable of this thesis is the level of strength of elite accommodation 
in Czechoslovakia during 1990-1992. I will seek to examine whether it determined 
peace during the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation and analyze its impact 
on the dependent variable; peace. 
  
The indicators for the level for strength of elite accommodation will be derived from 
the study done Eldersveld, Kooiman and van der Tak (1981) in the publication “Elite 
Images of Dutch Politics”. The authors linked their study of Dutch political elites to 
the consociational model of Dutch democracy. According to the model, in order for 
the vastly fragmented society to keep its viability, the elites are expected to be as 
much accommodative as possible. The authors state that elites are behaving in an 
accommodative way when they realize the existence of a social and political conflict 
and “believe in the resolution of such conflict, and willingness to work actively to 
resolve conflict” (Eldersveld, Kooiman & van der Tak, 1981, 235), regardless of their 
opinion on the conflict. 
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To study the accommodative behavior of elites, the authors used the following 
indicators.  
 
a. Information on the attitudes and behavior of ministers; 
b. The willingness to work towards conflict resolution; 
c. The way in which elites perceive the conflict; whether they see the conflict 
that arouse by disputes over the issue as reconcilable or not.  
d. The readiness of elites - especially the bargaining sides during a dispute – to 
propose an alternative to the resolution of the dispute.    
 
Their main argument assumes that the elite’s willingness to find a compromise is a 
characteristic mark of accommodative elite behavior. The authors assume that the 
leaders, which prefer to approach the conflict or a problem in a rather accommodative 
way, will more likely try to seek a solution to political conflict and will too be more 
likely to try to find compromises. As the level of elite accommodation is an 
independent variable of this thesis, inspired by the used indicators by Eldersveld, 
Kooiman, van der Tak, (which I have altered to suit my case study), the indicators of 
peace maintenance will be a high level of strength of elite accommodation. And the 
analyzed indicators of the level of strength of accommodation of Czechoslovak elites 
will be following: 
1. the pace of the negotiations  
2. the willingness of elites to compromise 
3. the fragmentation of political parties  
4. the elites behavior and attitudes of political representatives  
 
Mentioned indicators should be satisfactory to be able to conclude whether the elites 
in Czechoslovakia during 1990-1992 were inclined to compromise or not, therefore 
whether the level of strength of elite accommodation was high or strong, and 
consequently conclude in a what way it influenced the maintenance of peace. 
However, one needs to bear in mind that the factors that will be concluded after the 
analysis are considered a necessary factor that facilitates the sustainability of peace 
during state partition, but does not inherently guarantee it. On the same time it is 
essential to realize that the necessary factors do not need to appear in all peaceful 
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partitions. But it should be that as more of these factors are present, it is more likely 
for peace to be maintained.  
 
Data collection: 
For my analysis I collected data mainly from the peer reviews, but also from the 
available interviews conducted during the time of partition, newspapers and the media 
from the time period 1990-1992.   
 
Case selection: 
The hypothesis will be tested on the case study of Czechoslovakia and its peaceful 
partition process. I have chosen this case study because the political elites played a 
major role in this partition, and as their impact on the maintained peace during this 
partition was yet not studied. Therefore I will do so by testing it as a necessary factor 
that contributed to the peace. I believe that the analysis of the elite behavior and its 
impact on the peace during this partition will positively contribute to the study of 
peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia, as well as to the studies of state partition in 
general. 
 
Limitations of my research  
The limitation of my thesis is that I examine only one case study, which makes it 
difficult to further generalize. However, the peaceful partition cases are in general 
difficult to generalize as they vary in the factors case by case.  
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2   A Historical Overview on Czechoslovak common coexistence  
 
In order to be able to study the peace during the Czechoslovak partition and to 
examine what impact the level of political elites had particularly on the peace 
maintained during this partition, it is important to comprehend the evolution of the 
relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks. 
 
Austro-Hungarian Empire  
Czechs and Slovaks, as the two neighboring nations have a vivid history of common 
coexistence. Firstly, the two nations existed together under the umbrella of Austro-
Hungary until the end of World War I. The common cohabitation within this empire 
produced a good mutual relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks, as they were 
the most similar nations to one another – regarding the language and culture. Their 
mutual cooperation was a much easier option for them than cooperation with any 
other nation with which they were surrounded within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
However, the economic inequality between the Czech and Slovak lands had a 
negative impact on their mutual relationship (Musil, 1997).  
 
1918-1938 – First Czechoslovak Republic  
After the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that was the result of World War I, 
the first Czechoslovak state was established in 1918. This period is significant 
because of the first attempt to establish a democratic state. However, Slovakia was 
underrepresented in the state’s administration. This was mainly a product of the lack 
of suitably qualified men among the population in Slovakia (Bartlová, 1997). 
Subsequently, Slovaks soon became very displeased by their position, as well as 
‘Czech centralism’, which was formed right after the establishment of the common 
state. This resulted in the first appearance of the Slovak demands for autonomy. As 
Bartlová (1997, 176) pointed out “such a desire must be seen as a natural evolutionary 
stage of a developed nation, which craves a fair share of political power”. During this 
period Czechoslovakia was greatly economically flourishing. It was ranked as 
Europe’s fourth largest producer of steel and third largest producer of coal. Although 
the country was hit hard by the great depression, the country’s industrial based did not 
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take long to recover. Despite the state’s strong economic position, the European great 
powers still had a great say over country’s fate (Leff, 1996). 
 
1938 - 1945 – Occupation by Nazi Germany  
The dependence of Czechoslovakia’s fate on the European great powers was 
demonstrated in 1938, when Nazi Germany invaded the country. The state territory 
was divided into three parts; The Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, Slovak State, 
and the Czech’s former Sudetenland was annexed to Germany. The breakup of the 
state conducted by the Germans was facilitated by already existing economic tensions 
and pending political grievances that arose earlier. Although the country was still 
prospering economically, politically it was a period of a great oppression (Leff, 1996).  
 
1945 – 1992 Second Czechoslovak Republic   
By the end of World War II, the Soviet army had entered the country. The motivation 
to reestablish the common Czechoslovak state came from the realization of Czechs 
and Slovaks of benefits that generated from common coexistence, above all the 
greater security and chances for survival within the international arena. For the first 
three years, there was an intention of settling a democracy.  Since 1948 the entire 
political power was in the hands of communists. They attempted to reach an 
economic equality between the Czech and Slovak lands, as they believed that was a 
main root for ethno-nationalist tensions that already appeared during the interwar 
period (Rychlík, 1995). During the communist times, the country’s organization 
partially recognized Slovak national distinctiveness for the first time in the history of 
a common state. The Slovak National council and regional government were 
established in order to fulfill the promise of ‘equal asymmetry, which was given to the 
Slovaks when the nations were being reunited. However, there was not a real 
asymmetry as there was an absence of a Czech National Council. By the 1970’s a 
dissident movement arose, which reached its peak by 1989, when the Velvet 
Revolution took place with its main objective – to restore democracy in the country 
(Leff, 1996). 
 
As seen above, the history of the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks can be 
called  neutral, rather good than adverse.  The main cause of the tensions was mainly 
caused by Slovaks’ economic backwardness. Most importantly, there is no evidence 
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of any major ethnic conflicts between these two nations that led to any violent 
outbreaks. The two nations have no history of killing one another. An important key 
point to realize regarding the analysis of political elites is the impact that the 
Communist seizure of the power had on the political elites. The communist regime in 
Slovakia during 1945-1989 that was marked by the absence of democracy impeded 
any chances for Czechoslovak elites to develop the tradition of elite accommodation 
(Kopecký, 2000). Therefore, right after the Velvet Revolution, which freed 
Czechoslovakia from Soviet influence, the representatives of the political elites faced 
the challenge of learning how to compromise. Unfortunately, as will be shown in the 
following analysis, the Czechoslovak political elites failed to successfully address this 
challenge. At a certain moment, the willingness to compromise was so low that the 
only result that elites were able to reach was an impasse, which ultimately resulted 
into dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, this will be analyzed in the 
following chapter.  
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3   The Level of elite accommodation in Czechoslovakia 1990-1992 
 
In this part of my analysis, I am going to study the political elites of Czechoslovakia.  
The attitudes, behavior and decision of elites vastly influence the direction of 
evolution of society (Weber and Eisenstadt, 1968). By having the ability to access 
state institutions, and having the responsibility to address national problems, they are 
given the power to influence the way in which the politics of their country will be 
driven. Therefore, the elites play an enormous role in any society. The role of political 
elites was tremendous especially in the Czechoslovak case of partition, since they 
were the first, and the last to decide on whether the partition will proceed.  
 
In the case of Czechoslovakia, the elites were those who decided how the partition 
would be undertaken, and they were the ones to undertake it. Taking into 
consideration that the referendum did not take part during this partition, the people 
were not given a chance to express their wish whether to part of the federation or keep 
it. The political elites decided upon the fate of Czechoslovakia. “The political 
dynamics whereby the quest for national self-determination serves as a vehicle for 
enhancing the political power of certain leaders and elites was a factor in both the 
Czech and Slovak context” (Kraus & Stanger, 2000, 10). The political elites cannot 
stay unmentioned when studying the partition of Czechoslovakia. Not only is it 
important to mention them, but the study of their behavior, reactions and the level of 
accommodation of these elites will contribute to the studies of this partition. That 
further may help to set up the inspiration for other elites of countries facing the 
demands for partition, especially how to behave when such a proposal comes, in order 
to assure peace during the state partition. 
 
The objective of this analysis is to examine the level of elite accommodation of 
Czechoslovakia’s elites during the partition. I will evaluate the level of strength of 
their accommodation and will test the hypothesis of this thesis that suggests that The 
peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia was facilitated by the high level of strong inter-
elite accommodation. In order to conduct a study of these elites, the main indicators 
showing the level of strength of accommodation of these elites will be as follow: the 
pace of the negotiations, the compromise, the fragmentation of the political parties 
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and finally, the attitudes and behavior of the ministers. Inspired by the study of 
Eldersveld, Kooiman and Tak (1981), who tested Dutch elites in 1981, the above 
mentioned indicators are considered in this thesis as a sign of behavior of congruence 
and willingness to compromise, which is the main characteristic of a high level of 
strength of inter-elite accommodation.  
 
Prior to the conducted research, the expected empirical evidence was that the level of 
political elites during the Czechoslovak partition was high and that was the important 
complementing factor, which smoothed up the whole process of Czechoslovak 
partitioning. Notwithstanding, the findings during the research demonstrate the 
contrary. The protracted negotiations; intransigence of Slovak radicals and 
nationalists; the alternatives proposed largely only by the one side (pro-federalist 
groups); as well as the breakup of important political parties; all constitute evidence 
of weakness of elite accommodation in Czechoslovakia during 1990-1992, and 
correspondingly the tested hypothesis of this thesis is therefore disproved.  
 
The chapter will be divided into 5 subchapters. The first four subchapters will one by 
one study the indicators of the level of elite accommodation; 1 the pace of the 
negotiations, 2 the compromise, 3 the fragmentation of the political parties, 4 the 
attitudes and behavior of the ministers. The last subchapter will pay attention to the 
reaction of the predecessor state to a Slovak demands for sovereignty.  
 
3.1 The Pace of the partition process  
 
One of the indicators of the level of elite accommodation in this thesis will be the 
pace of the negotiations that accompanied the partition process of Czechoslovakia. 
The strong level of elite accommodation assumes quick negotiations and swiftly met 
compromises. It is important to mention that not all the events and dates will be 
presented only those that are relevant indicators of the pace of the negotiations.  
 
After the Czechoslovak elites gained full control over their country, the very first 
negotiations and settling of the form of the country could commence. These started on 
11 April 1990 when the leaders and representatives of governments of both, Czech 
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and Slovak lands met. Nevertheless, at the very beginning, many conflicting issues 
emerged as new negotiation dates had to be set in order to address them (Leff, 1996).  
 
Hyphen War   
The very first problematic issue that occurred was the dispute over the alternation of 
country’s post communist name, which was later coined with title a hyphen-war 
(Leff, 1996). The Federal Assembly needed to tackle the problem of owning a still 
communist name, which had been used prior to 1960. The objective was to delete the 
word “socialist” from the country’s name and create a new name that would reflect 
more precisely the new democratic setting of the country. The president Václav Havel 
suggested three different versions at the beginning of 1990. However, the so called 
“war”, or rather said the quarrel, started after the Slovak National Council expressed 
their discontent with all three proposals presented by the president of the federation. 
They believed that all those proposals expressed a Slovaks’ subordinated position 
toward Czechs and that the proposed names did not explicitly manifested the fact that 
the country was composed of two and not only one nation (Young, 1994). None of the 
proposed names were satisfactory for Slovaks, but they proposed an alternative name 
the ‘Federation of Czecho-Slovakia. However, this proposal was rejected by Czechs 
as they commented that it evoked the painful memories from the times of German 
occupation (Žák, 1997).  
 
The quarrel led to an intense debate and it took about three months –from 23 January 
1990 until 20 April 1990 - to find a solution that would satisfy all bargaining sides 
(ibid.). On 29 March 1990 it seemed that the Federal Assembly put the “war” to an 
end, by approving constitutional law 81/1990 that set the Czechoslovak Federal 
Republic as an official name of the country (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). Nevertheless, 
the name provoked demonstrations in Slovakia led by the Movement for an 
Independent Slovakia who opposed the country’s new name. This was also the first 
time the very first expressions and slogans regarding the independent Slovak state 
emerged. A definite end to a “hyphen war” can be dated on 20 April 1990, when the 
Federal Assembly complied with Slovak demands by approving constitutional law 
101/1990. The Federal Assembly approved two separate versions of the name in the 
language of each nation; in Czech the unofficial name would be spelled as 
“Czechoslovakia” and the adjective “Czechoslovak”, whilst in Slovak the name 
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would be written with a hyphen and capital S “Czecho-Slovakia” (Kraus & Stanger, 
2000; Žák, 1997; Young, 1994).  
 
Bearing in mind that the first discussions on the country’s name started by early 1990 
and that the final approval of the name took place on 20 April 1990, the calculations 
show that it took almost about 4 months to find an agreement. That is to say that it 
took a long time for the Czech and Slovak leaders to find a name that would satisfy 
the needs of all. Already, only the name of the country evoked complications with 
many rejected proposals and lengthy discussions. To summarize, all considered 
evidence reduces the level of strength of accommodation of Czechoslovak elites, 
supposing that the high level of strength of elite accommodation is characteristic by 
the fast pace of the negotiations; that is seen as proof that the compromise is met 
smoothly. When it came to the talks on even more important issues as, for instance, 
the form of the state or the constitution of the country, the pace of these talks yet 
decelerated. This will be shown in the following section.  
 
The form of the state  
The second open Czech-Slovak dispute was linked to the principles of the future of 
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. On 11 April 1990, the unofficial negotiations 
between the premiers of the countries began. Slovak political party the Public Against 
Violence (VPN) recommended a program according to which the negotiations would 
be based on the principle from 1968 when the debate between the two countries 
would be seen as the debate between the two independent republics. The formal 
negotiations were planned to set forth after the first free elections would take place on 
8-9 June 1990 (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). Two months after the first general elections, 
on 8-9 August 1990 the negotiations between the two governments started. However, 
it was impossible to reach an agreement on what form the country should have. Czech 
representatives favored the preservation of the federation that would keep their 
prerogatives over the control of foreign policy, finance and defense. On the other side, 
Slovak officials advocated a situation in which the Czechs and Slovaks would have 
their own states, operating within one common confederation and via confederal 
institutions. Because of the difficulties of coming to an agreement, the representatives 
of all three governments (Slovak, Czech and Federal) together with  President Václav 
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Havel, issued a declaration on 28 November 1990. In this document all sides 
proclaimed their will to maintain the federal form of the state (Měchýř, 1991).  
 
Here we can see that the consultations about the form of the state started by April 
1990 and were closed by the end of November 1990. After almost 8 months and 
numerous meetings the bargaining sides finally found a compromise of keeping the 
federal form and issued a declaration. Even the most radical political part the Slovak 
National Party (SNS) signed the document, although they proclaimed that they 
wouldn’t give up on their idea of a confederation as their long-term goal (Kraus & 
Stanger, 2000). The fact that the agreement was finally reached can be considered a 
sign of Czechoslovak elites’ willingness to compromise. Therefore the establishment 
of this document would strengthen the examined level of elite accommodation in 
Czechoslovakia. But the examination cannot be completed yet, as despite the fact that 
a declaration was signed, the Slovak party SNS together with other nationalist parties 
later strengthened their demands to establish a confederation and were reluctant to 
adjust this demand. Therefore further study needs to be conducted, and will be done 
in the next section. However, regarding the study of pace of the negotiations and the 
argument that quick negotiations and readily met compromise is a sign of the high 
level of the elite accommodation, we observe from the before-mentioned events that 
the talks about the state form were still lengthy and the agreement required many 
meetings in order to be settled. In this case, the slow pace of the process of these 
negotiations is an indicator of low level of the Czechoslovak elite’s accommodation.  
 
The power-sharing constitutional amendment  
The clashes and the lack of the common opinion appeared also regarding the matter of 
power-sharing within the federation. Prolonged negotiations were undertaken with the 
objective to find a solution that would fit to all bargaining sides. However, the issue 
spurred few fruitful debates. The state officials met at following meetings; 8-9 August 
1990 in Trenčianske Teplice; 10-11 September 1990 in Piešťany; 27 September 1990 
in Kroměříž, 28 October 1990 in Slavkov, 5 November 1990 in Prague, and 6-7 
November 1990 in Luhačovice (Rychlík, 2000, 53).  Many of the above-mentioned 
negotiations settled some issues but the main matter remained unresolved. At the 
meeting in Prague on 5 November 1990, the three ministers, Marián Čalfa (federal), 
Pithart (Czech Prime Minister) and Vladimír Mečiar (Slovak Prime Minister) 
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addressed the majority of the problematic issues connected with the division of the 
powers. Despite all the disputes that preceded this meeting in Prague, with the 
exception of few issues, the new agreement was approved on following days 6-7 
November 1990. The agreement was indistinguishable from the one already proposed 
4 months ago in Trenčianske Teplice. The first document however did not get the 
support of the Slovak national Party SNS and eight other Slovak national parties 
(Obrman and Pehe, 1990).  
 
The new agreement did not put an end to the disputes regarding the matter of power-
sharing, as the federal government agreed only in principle and it “viewed some of the 
provisions as adversely affecting the ability of federal agencies to function properly” 
(Kraus & Stanger, 2000, 311). There was a need for the revision of the document 
before it would become law. The revised version of the document was approved 
unanimously on 15 November 1990 by the federal government and only a day after 
by the Czech government. It took one week for the Slovak government to approve it, 
but once they did, the approval was also unanimous. Finally, the agreement was 
passed by the Slovak National Council on 21 November 1990 and on 29 November 
1990 by the Czech National Council before it became law (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). 
 
Although the Slovak National Council did agree with the document, only a couple of 
days later the government issued a declaration which proclaimed the supremacy of 
Slovak laws over the laws of the Czechoslovak federation (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). 
The end of the disputes linked with power-sharing came finally to an end on 12 
December 1990. After almost five months, The Federal Assembly passed the power-
sharing constitutional amendment drafted in November with few alternations. The 
new version gave more extensive powers to the republican government, although the 
Federal Assembly maintained its power over the crucial matters such as economic and 
financial strategy, foreign policy, defence, ethnic minority affairs and in the case of an 
emergency also of energy distribution. Notwithstanding, the central issue – power –
sharing was not tackled as the officials did not manage to settle precise parameters of 
decentralization (Obrman and Pehe, 1990).  
 
Not only were the negotiations to address power-sharing of the state long-drawn-out, 
but they failed to produce a comprehensive solution to the conflicting issue. The very 
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final solution that addressed the problem of power-sharing was the passing of the two 
constitutional amendments by the Federal Assembly after the election in 1992, on 8 
October 1992. The amendments distributed the federal powers among the two 
republics, as well as reduced the amount of federal ministries from previous number 
of fifteen, to only five (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). But this was after what the leaders 
already decided to dissolve a country. Additionally, the economy was also a 
conflicting matter that played an important role in deterioration of the discussions. 
The Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus himself pinpointed that the economy was the 
factor for which the negotiations were dragged on. Slovak foot-dragging jointly on 
economic and the power-sharing issues were said to be the factors that complicated 
and prolonged the debates, as well as the cause of the Czech frustration (Young, 
1994). 
 
The power-sharing debates once again bear the signs of slowness. Here it is 
demonstrated that power–sharing was yet another issue that Czechoslovak leaders 
found difficult to tackle. After the talks that commenced on 8-9 August 1990 by the 
meeting in Trenčianske Teplice, the ultimate version of the document that finally 
settled the dispute was accepted on 12 December 1990. But even then the central 
issue of power-sharing was not comprehensively addressed as the leaders did not set 
the precise parameters of decentralization. The politicians accepted their incapability 
to come up with the solution that would serve the needs of all and so they agreed to 
disagree. Once again, as in the previous case of debates on the form of state, the step 
of politicians to agree to disagree, to rather dissolve the country than to give up on 
their demands and find a common solution is a sign of a low level of elite 
accommodation. As in this case we are examining pace of the events as an indicator 
of the level of elite accommodation, henceforth it is important to realize that the final 
agreement on the power-sharing required about 5 months of negotiations, 6 official 
meetings, and two revisions, before it was reached. In other words, the pace of these 
negotiations was tedious and slow, that diminishes a level of accommodation of 
Czechoslovak elites.  
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The New Constitution 
A deep constitutional uncertainty accompanied Czechoslovakia since the end of the 
Velvet Revolution, through the elections in June 1992 and even beyond. The second 
crucial topic of the heated discussions was the constitution as a whole. In 
Czechoslovakia the old constitution did not serve the then-current needs and needed 
to be revised. Additionally, there was also a need to draft the constitutions for each 
republic. The officials were realizing that such complex tasks, being the revision of an 
old constitution and draft a two new constitutions demands a long time. As that 
process in that particular moment seemed as not pressing, the talks regarding the 
finishing of the federal constitution were postponed and agreed to be reopen at the 
next elections (Schwartz 1991). After the election, President Václav Havel met the 
Slovak Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský on 5 September 1991 with the objective to 
plan the further steps that needed to be taken in order to set the preparations of all 
three (federal and of each republic) constitutions (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). The talks 
took place also because of the growing tensions between the two corrival groups: on 
one side a group of Czech and federal representatives, and the group of Slovak 
authorities on the other. The outcome of the talks was that issues, which gained the 
consent of both sides, were listed and a new deadline for finishing the constitution 
(end of 1991) was planned. However, these were mainly marginal matters. By the 
new deadline all of Czechoslovakia’s constitutional setup basic documents were 
supposed to be completed. Although the disputes over the constitutions tried to be 
resolved from the very beginning of the transition to democracy in 1990, the elites 
failed to resolve them even during 1991 and 1992. The happenings that followed after 
determined fate of constitution, as well as of the state (Schwartz 1991). Eventually, 
the events that followed after the elections in 1992 led to the approval of the 
legislation on the dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation, understandably, there 
was no more need to discuss or establish a common federal constitution. Therefore, 
no additional meetings connected with constitutions occurred.  
 
The negotiations regarding the constitution can be traced from the first post-
revolution official meetings until the moment when the republican leaders agreed on 
the dissolution of the state in the second half of 1992.  Definitely the pace of the 
constitutional talks was anything, but quick. The level of the elite accommodations is 
therefore in this case once again weakened and considered low.  
 
 
  29 
The path towards the agreement on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia  
Another focal point of the debates was a state treaty. During the mediations on 3-4 
February 1991, of which the objective was the preparations of a new constitution, the 
chairman of the Slovak nationalist political party named Christian Democratic 
Movement (KDH) presented an order in which the constitutions should be approved 
after the documents were finalized. The order recommended that firstly, the republic 
constitutions should be approved individually, that they should be followed by the 
agreement to enter the state treaty, and only afterwards the voting on the approval of a 
federal constitution should be commenced. As Jiří Pehe (1991a, 6-7) described, such a 
scenario would indirectly guide to what nationalist groups were aiming for “the de 
facto declaration that Slovak laws have precedence over those of the federation”. The 
KDH gained the support of its coalition partners; the Public Against Violence (VPN) 
and the Slovak Democratic Party; concerning the proposed order. However the order 
was strongly opposed by Václav Havel who coined the order as unconstitutional as 
neither republic had a state of sovereignty, which according to international law 
enables a state to sign a state treaty (Pehe, 1991a). 
 
On 12 September 1991 a document “Initiative for a Sovereign Slovakia” was signed 
by Vladimír Mečiar and other thirty-four representatives of the Slovak political elite. 
The document called for the National Slovak Council to approve a ‘full constitution, 
by full meaning a document with content different from the federal constitution, as 
well as to approve the declaration of Slovak sovereignty issued on 7 March 1991 by 
five Slovak nationalist groups. However, the Slovak National Council rejected the 
request as well as any other bids to force a vote on the document (Kraus & Stanger, 
2000). 
 
The Czechoslovak relations grew complicated. František Mikloško, the chairman of 
the Slovak Parliament lodged a complaint on 28 October 1991 about debates on the 
fate of Czechoslovakia being too tedious and long – eight months (Kraus & Stanger, 
2000). This demonstrates that there was a growing frustration not only on the Czech 
side, but also that the Slovak elites were becoming impatient. The relations were 
aggravated by still existing disagreements about the fundamental issues; the nature of 
the state treaty and the division of the powers. The leading politicians of both 
republics met with Václav Havel in Hradáček also on 3 November 1991 to debate on 
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mentioned constitutional issues. Later on another meeting took place on 11-12 
November 1991. Regardless the number of conducted meeting, the Slovak Presidium 
was not capable of reaching consensus. The Czech Prime Minister Pithart described a 
situations as a “failure” (Jiří Pehe, 1991d). 
 
As no progress was made and all the talks led only to a stalemate, on 17 November 
1991 Václav Havel presented a proposal to the Federal Assembly for the approval of 
five constitutional amendments, most of which the Federal Parliament rejected. After 
months of debates, a step forward was finally made on 9 February 1992 in Milovy 
(Kraus & Stanger, 2000). The present politicians agreed on defining the future of the 
relationship between the two republics and on keeping the country together, 
accordingly a treaty was drafted. Nevertheless, it was immediately rejected by the 
presidium of Slovak parliament. The happenings were labelled by federal Prime-
Minister Čalfa as the commencement of the partition of the Czechoslovakia (Musil, 
1997).  
 
The above-mentioned negotiations were yet another chain of meetings marked by the 
slow pace. We can actually understand them as the continuation of the constitutional 
talks that were complicated by the appearance of the disputes over the new matters; 
the state treaty and the order of approval of the constitutions. We derive from this that 
the level of elite accommodation decreases with the prolongation of negotiations.  
 
General Elections 1992 
The general elections were held on 5 and 6 June 1992 with the victory of Václav 
Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech Republic and Mečiar’s 
Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in Slovakia. Henceforth, the first rounds 
of the talks on the future of the relationship between the republics started in Brno on 9 
June 1992, where Klaus explicitly expressed his reluctance to become a prime 
minister of the federal parliament (Leff, 1996).  
 
The second round of talks took place in 11 June 1992. However, the two republics 
had a different vision of the Czechoslovakia. These two visions were incompatible, as 
the Slovak side continued to demand the creation of a confederation and the Czech 
side favored a continuation of federation. Further talks were necessary. Therefore, the 
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representatives met again on 17 June 1992, but once again they failed to find an 
accord on the principles of a new federation. By the end of the June 1992, the two 
republics’ governments were sworn in. Mečiar proclaimed on 23 June 1992 that the 
new government of Slovakia would declare the republic’s sovereignty in July and 
subsequently, adopt a new Slovak constitution (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). On 2 July 
1992, a federal government was also sworn in. On 16 July 1992 the Federal Assembly 
approved a program of the federal government proposed by Prime Minister Jan 
Stráský, in which the Prime Minister called for the republics’ parliaments to find a 
compromise over the future of Czechoslovak relations by the end of September 1992. 
In the end, on 22 and 23 July 1992 Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar reached an 
agreement to submit a law with the name “On the End of the Federation” by 30 
September. By the consent of both leaders, the Czechoslovak Security and 
Information Agency would be split by approval of this document. (Leff, 1996) 
 
After the representatives of both republics agreed on the dissolution of the country, 
the Federal government approved, and the Federal Assembly later submitted, a draft 
law on the abolition of the Czecho-Slovak Federative Republic. Subsequently, there 
was a necessity to pass a bill on the dissolution of the federation. On the anniversary 
of the Velvet Revolution (17 November 1992) the parliaments of both republics urged 
the Federal Assembly to do so. Therefore, the voting procedure took place on 18 
November 1992, however unsuccessfully. The approval of the legislation on 
dissolution failed to gain the majority by only three votes in the Slovak section in the 
Chamber of the Nations (Musil, 1997). It was blocked by opposition deputies, which 
were asking for the ‘ratification referendum regarding the split to be held. A week 
later, on 25 November 1992 the Federal Assembly finally succeeded in approving the 
legislation on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia by passing it by a three-vote majority 
(Leff, 1996). Afterwards, the leaders continued the talks on the breakup of the country 
on 26 August 1992 in Brno. Ultimately, Klaus and Mečiar agreed on the breakup of 
Czechoslovakia and on the republics functioning as separated and sovereign states by 
1 January 1993 (Kraus & Stanger, 2000).  
 
Here we can see that once the leaders found consent to submit law names  “On the 
End of the Federation” the negotiations gained a faster tempo. Although the approval 
on the dissolution of the state within the Federal Assembly was firstly slew down by 
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the Slovak section of the Chamber of the Nations (that also indicates the split in 
opinion on confederation within the Slovak elites), shortly after one week the Federal 
Assembly finally approved the legislation on the dissolution of the state (Musil, 
1997).  
 
The pace of the negotiations was faster once after the Czech side changed their stance, 
which was a result of the election of new leader, Václav Klaus. Therefore we could 
say that the level of elite accommodation grew by the change of leadership. However, 
we cannot say that, as the evidence above demonstrate that the leaders could not find 
a compromise on the fundamental issue. The only solution they found was a 
dissolution of country, but this however is linked with the sign of an intransigence; 
that is contrary to accommodative behavior. Later we will see how leaders gradually 
continued on the dissolution of the country. Neither of them wanted to drag the talks 
anymore as they became tedious and were already going on since early 1990. Such a 
situation strengthened the motivation of leaders to find a settlement quickly, although 
it would have be the dissolution of the country.  
 
The dissolution of the state  
After the agreement on the breakup of Czechoslovakia was reached on 26 August 
1992, the negotiations became faster, but not smoother, neither less complex. The 
leaders of the two republics needed to decide on the precise steps that would be taken 
in order to part the country. They expressed their unwillingness to protract the 
negotiations any longer, especially Czech leader Václav Klaus. He said that “every 
day this country is losing the chance for economical revival, the chance for stability, 
and that is something which no politician can or should have the right to accept” 
(FBIS, 12 June 1992, 19). The promised deadline to resolve the crucial constitutional 
matters set on 30 September 1992 accelerated the pace of the negotiations. By the end 
of September, the bargaining sides managed to find a consent regarding the steps that 
would be conducted to part a country. They agreed on the main principles that would 
determine the relationship between the two republics after the partition of 
Czechoslovakia as well. It did not take a long time for leaders to set another deadline 
(1 January 1993) by which Czechoslovakia should cease its existence. Afterwards, 
only within four months, the steps such as negotiating, drafting the agreements and 
their signing took place at the following crucial meetings: in Jihlava on 6-7 October, 
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in Javorina on 25-26 October, in Zidlochovice on 9 November 1992 and in Bratislava 
on 23 November (Young, 1994). Robert Young (1994) described this period as one of 
“frenetic political activity”, when many matters were left behind unresolved, but once 
the republics’ representatives made the decision to part the country “no time was lost” 
(ibid., 41). As promised, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist by the end of the night of 31 
December 1992 and since 1 January 1992 the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic have functioned as two new separate and sovereign republics (Kraus & 
Stanger, 2000).  
 
The strong level of elite accommodation assumes quick negotiations and swiftly met 
compromises. However, as shown above, the negotiations during the Czechoslovak 
partition were protracted and the disputes that started clashes between the elites’ 
opinion regarding the constitutional talks started in 1990 were dragged on all the way 
until the elections in 1992. After the elections, although the crucial meetings that 
divided the country were already swifter, the whole process took about three years 
time. Robert Young pointed out a reason for the prolonged negotiations claiming that 
the Slovak Nationalists persistently delayed and modified the reforms that at the end 
complicated the finding of a settlement. He described the situation stating that 
“Slovaks were not clear about their intent to secede until relatively late in the game, 
and their vacillation and uncertainty hindered settlement of outstanding constitutional 
differences within the union” (Young, 1994, vi).  
 
After the elections in 1992 the new leadership sped up the pace of negotiations. 
Obviously the process of partition of state itself was conducted swiftly; we can say 
that the level of elite accommodation grew stronger. But still, the negotiations on the 
future relationship of the two nations also faced many obstacles and were too 
complicated, many meetings needed to be conducted. 
 
To conclude the whole subchapter on the indicator “the pace of the negotiations”, we 
can see from the evidence that except the process of partition itself, the negotiations 
on all the other matters were protracted and lengthy. Therefore we can conclude that 
the pace of these negotiations indicated the low level of elite accommodation. The 
above mentioned events demonstrate that the talks were oftentimes complicated by 
the Slovak side blocking the approvals of agreements, unwilling to compromise, as 
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well as strengthening their nationalist demands. The more comprehensive study on 
the complications of settling the compromise will be provided in the following 
chapter, in which the second indicator “the compromise” will be addressed.  
 
3.2   The willingness to compromise  
 
This subchapter is dedicated to the examination of the indicator of elite 
accommodation number 2; the compromise. More specifically, I will have a close 
look at the negotiations with the objective to see whether the compromise was met 
easily or whether there were any complications. If the complications were present, 
then it is further in our interest to study what was the cause of these complications. 
Based on the hypothesis, the main argument regarding the compromise is that when 
the level of strength of elite accommodation is high, the compromise will be met 
without any complications. However, if the negotiations lead to a stalemate and if the 
documents are repeatedly being rejected, that shows unwillingness to compromise and 
therefore is a sign of a low level of elite accommodation. As the hypothesis is that the 
high level of elite accommodation in Czechoslovakia was a necessary factor that 
helped to maintain the peace during the partition, we assume that there was a high 
level of elite accommodation. This suggests that we can expect to find many easily 
met agreements satisfying all sides, no rejected documents and especially no 
stalemates. However the main findings reached after conducted research indicates that 
the willingness to compromise was especially coming from the advocates of the 
federation and Czech elites (until the elections 1992). The Slovak elites showed an 
obstinacy and unwillingness to compromise on their demands.  
 
The hyphen war 
The negotiations about the name of the country were the first talks between the Czech 
and Slovak elites that bore the first complications. These complications led to the 
prolonged disputes later labeled as the hyphen war. In the review of the events in the 
previous chapter1 we could see that Václav Havel, then President of Czechoslovakia 
proposed the three options for the new name of the country. However the all three 
proposals were rejected by the Slovak National Council, which condemned the 
                                                
1 In order to prevent from repeating myself regarding the events, I will oftentimes reffer to the previous 
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proposals stating that they put the Slovak nation into a subordinate position towards 
Czechs. Therefore they have proposed a new name “Federation of Czecho-Slovakia”. 
Nevertheless, this time the Czech side opposed the name as inappropriate to use, as it 
brought back the bad memory of German occupation (Žák, 1997). 
 
Slovaks insisted on incorporation of the hyphen and capital S into the new name to 
express that the Czechoslovak Federation is a country of two equal nations. After four 
months of debates the republics obtained a right to use the name which they perceived 
convenient for them, therefore the federation was, in the Czech Republic, 
Czechoslovakia (without a hyphen) and, in the Slovak Republic, Czecho-Slovakia 
(with hyphen). The demands for formal equality were of great importance to Slovaks. 
It was felt during the negotiations that all of the sudden even the politicians that 
before did not show much interest in nationalistic issues, became eager nationalists 
during the hyphen war (Leff, 1996). The debate on the name as well as on the 
reformation of the state resulted in the debates marked with frequent stalemates 
regarding the matters on which the agreement was already reached. As P. Kopecký 
described it, “the debate had produced the climate of almost total political immobility 
as well as adversity and distrust between the politicians” (Kopecký, 2000).  
 
To conclude the whole “war”, although the compromise was met (that both sides 
could choose the name they liked), the debate spurred a nationalistic feeling on the 
Slovak side. Slovak nationalists were later trying to push through more and more 
nationalistic demands regarding Slovak sovereignty. Looking at the fact that the 
compromise was met, we could conclude that the level of elite accommodation was 
high. Even so, these debates manifested obstinacy on the Slovak side and an 
unwillingness to adjust their demands. Therefore the level of elite accommodation can 
be in this case described as weakened by intransigence of Slovak elites.  
 
 
 
 
 
The compromise to give up on the negotiations  
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The negotiations regarding the constitutions, their order of approval, the power-
sharing, as well as the form of the state was finalized in the period after the elections 
of 1992. This actually occurred when both sides agreed that it was impossible to 
resolve it, and terminated the disputes by agreeing on the dissolution of the state. In 
the previous chapter we saw that all the negotiations were lengthy, the meetings 
frequently repeated and many did not resolve the main issues. In the previous chapter 
we could see that as the leaders met an impasse on the constitutions and power 
sharing, and after numerous conducted meetings, they agreed to postpone the further 
talks for after the general elections in 1992. This proves the low level of elite 
accommodation, as the sides were unable to find a compromise.  
 
The negotiations were oftentimes dragged on and blocked by the Slovak side, 
especially by Slovak nationalists in the beginning. There were 6 official meetings 
conducted and two revisions until it finally looked like that the agreement on power-
sharing was settled (on 21 November 1990). The Slovak national Party SNS and eight 
other smaller Slovak political parties rejected the very first accord met in Trenčianske 
Teplice. SNS urged for the constitution to be rewritten in such a way, that Slovakia 
would be seen as an independent state. The Slovak National Party was intransigent in 
their demands. Czech Prime Minister Pithart replied to SNS that the presented 
constitutional draft was the only possible alternative on how to disintegrate the state. 
Subsequently SNS reacted by voicing their opinions during the memorial celebrations 
of Slovak Nationalist Andrej Hlinka that followed on 25-26 august 1990 (Leff, 1996). 
The SNS proponents yelled slogans like ‘down with the Czechoslovak federation, or 
“long live the Slovak state.” Therefore further talks on power-sharing were required. 
Although the agreement on power-sharing was made in the Prague on 5 November, 
the leaders failed to agree on its central issue. Despite the fact that the Slovak 
National Council also approved it on 29 November, the Council was meanwhile 
preparing the declaration on supremacy of Slovak laws over federal laws (Kraus & 
Stanger, 2000).  
 
On the same time, the Slovak Prime Minister Mečiar and the Foreign Minister of 
Federation Dienstbier agreed on establishment of an institution for international 
relations that was supposed to be headed by a member of the Slovak government. 
This was one of the first signs of the Slovak’s will for a looser federation and greater 
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autonomy. Later on, the Slovak National Council refused to accept an emergency bill 
approved by the Federal Government as they believed that it preserved too much 
power to the federal government (Leff, 1996). Young (1994) observed that the pace of 
the negotiations was draw by the side that was lest ready to compromise. According 
to him the advantage was in the hands of that side that was ready to accept the 
partition of the state and its consequences, which he claimed was from the beginning 
the Slovak side.  
 
Referring to the negotiations regarding the constitutions and the state treaty, the key 
point to highlight is the intransigence of Slovaks demonstrated firstly by insisting on 
approving the state treaty before the approval of the constitutions, secondly Mečiar’s 
urging the Slovak National Council to approve the Slovak constitution and declaration 
on Slovak Sovereignty from 7 March 1991, and finally the Slovak Parliament’s 
presidium’s rejection of Milovy accord, a treaty that talked about keeping the country 
together. All these events show there was a will on part of the Slovak elite that wished 
for the greater autonomy of Slovakia and denied the classic federal form that was 
already established. Their rejection of any accords on the federal form of the state 
indicates the unwillingness to compromise or to give up their demands, which further 
manifests the low elite accommodation.  The elections of 1992 finalized the stalemate 
on the constitution talks.  
 
After the elections of 1992  
The results of the general elections 1992 produced a shift in the stance of the Czech 
side. The change was caused by the elections of a new leader Václav Klaus. He was 
rigidly committed to defend the federal form as the best possible form of 
Czechoslovakia. Actually, that was the only possible form that he was open to agree 
on. His main focus was aimed at  economic reform and tighter federation. This vision 
did not comply with the Slovak presidium. As already mentioned, Slovaks, and 
especially the new leader Vladimír Mečiar, preferred a loose and decentralized 
confederation (Mlynář, 1992).  However, in the opinion of Václav Klaus, this form of 
the state was intolerable. The elections were won by the two leaders who were not 
capable of settling an agreement on how to further continue the existence of the state, 
and therefore it led them to the question whether they should continue its existence. 
As we have observed, although the Slovak side was most of the time the one to 
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complicate the debates, reject the proposals and in the case of the nationalist parties 
those who were pushing for the request of Slovak sovereignty, at the end Czechs led 
by Klaus were the ones who started the actual process of dissolving the country (Leff, 
1996). Klaus declared the federation to be dead as he commented that it was evident 
that the visions of such a divisive character were evidently incompatible and therefore 
it was impossible to reach a compromise. Mečiar accused Klaus stating that he 
“decreed the state after forty minutes” (Vladimír Mečiar, Interview with Le Monde, 7 
July 1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-131, 8 July 1992) and forced the Slovak side to agree on 
the partition of the country. But we can see from the events previously described in 
the chapter “the pace of the negotiations” that Vladimír Mečiar was neither much 
willing to abandon, nor adjust his vision of decentralized confederation.  
 
The Process of partition 
The Process of partition was just as complicated as the negotiations on the 
continuation on the state that preceded it, although the settlement was made quickly. 
The revision of the constitution needed the support of at least three-fifths of both 
chambers of the Federal Assembly; however the federal government did not have 
enough of the required votes. HZDS even supported the Czech opposition in October 
1992 to help pass the nonbinding resolution. This resolution was supposed to 
scrutinize the ‘Czech-Slovak Union, that was actually a confederal structure similar to 
what had been proposed by HZDS previously. The idea of the “Czech-Slovak Union” 
expressed a kind of will of joint coexistence between the two republics. Since the 
Czech Prime Minister already spurned HZDS’s proposal of confederation, as the 
“Czech-Slovak Union” had an identical structure as the Mečiar’s previous proposal, 
Klaus rejected it. At this instant the governing Czech majority was the one to impede 
the continuation of the common state. He stated that any alternative other than 
dissolution of the state was just deleterious, as it was already too late and the only best 
solution that the elites could opt for was the Velvet Divorce. After two failed 
attempts, the Federal Assembly finally agreed on parting the federation (Pehe, 1992c). 
 
The happenings manifest the change of the Czech approach to the negotiations from 
the one before the elections. The reason for the change was simply the new 
government that championed the federation and was not willing to step aside and led 
HZDS to fulfil its vision of a confederal Czechoslovakia. The Slovak side was not 
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ready to succumb to the federal vision of Václav Klaus and his supporters. This is a 
clear demonstration of the unwillingness to compromise expressed by both the Czech 
and Slovak sides. Certainly, it is an indicator of a very low level of elite 
accommodation. 
 
To conclude this subchapter, we can say that the Slovak side blocked the majority of 
the negotiations. Slovaks unwillingness to agree on a majority of the issues compelled 
the Czech Republic to step aside on the important matters. In the cases when an 
impasse was reached and an agreement impossible, both sides were ready to accept 
the impasse and the consequences that it carried. The negotiations on the form of the 
state and constitutions were finalized in the period after the elections of 1992, when 
both sides accepted the impasse. The character of the meetings changed when the 
parliament changed after the elections of 1992. The new Czech leader approached the 
issue of the form of the state determined not to cease to Slovak requests of a looser 
decentralized confederal form. The events and attitudes of the leaders from after the 
elections of 1992 manifest the high intransigence from both sides. Therefore I 
conclude that the lack of a compromise proven in this subchapter manifests the weak 
and low level of the elite accommodation in Czechoslovakia.  
 
3.3    The fragmentation of Czechoslovak political parties 
 
This part of the analysis focuses on the inner clashes of the political parties in 
Czechoslovakia. The fundamental issues regarding the political form of the country 
and the constitutional matters did not evoke the disputes only between the Czech and 
Slovak politicians, but clashes in opinions emerged also within the factions. The 
incompatibility of these opinions caused the fragmentation of the two main political 
parties; Civic Forum in the Czech Republic, and the Public Against Violence in 
Slovakia. As the focus of this thesis is the elite accommodation, the fragmentation of 
the political parties that occurred during 1990-1992 cannot remain unnoticed. The fact 
that the variety of opinions over the issues caused the dissolution of particular parties 
indicates that its representatives preferred the dissolution of the party rather than 
further talks with the objective of finding an agreement. Such attitude bears a sign of 
intransigence, which is contrary to the typical attitude characteristic to a strong level 
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of elite accommodation; the willingness to find a compromise (Eldersveld, Kooiman 
and van der Tak, 198). 
 
The situation of Czechoslovak political arena after the Velvet Revolution 
The Velvet Revolution triggered a boom in the formation of new political parties. 
Only six weeks after the Velvet Revolution successfully overthrew communism, 40 
brand new parties were already established, and the number grew to 100 by July 1990 
(Pehe, 1991c, 2). The polarization between the political elites that consequently 
emerged greatly influenced the pace of events, which ultimately led towards the 
partition of the state. As Brown (1994) stated “the break up was driven by political 
polarization of intensely partisan groups who engaged in mutually profitable 
antagonism” (Brown, 1994, vii). He adds that the political parties together with their 
leaders were reluctant to make an appeal to broader constituency, and that it was in 
their interest that referendum on the secession would not be held (ibid.).  
   
The fragmentation started just ten days after the elections in 1990, spurred by the 
separation of the Liberal-Democratic party from Civic Forum (Czech). Then the 
demise of the Christian Democratic alliance, caused by Čarnogursky’s proclamation 
to participate in the Slovak government followed. The alternations happened also 
within the Communists who created its new form, the Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia (Pehe, 1990) However, the dissolution of the Czech Civic Forum, from 
which Klaus’s new party ODS emerged, and the split of the Slovak VPN from which 
Premier Vladimír Mečiar walked out and in the aftermath created his own political 
party, HZDS; had the gravest impact on the partition of the country. 
 
The split of Civic Forum  
After the elections in 1990, the Czech political party Civic Forum had a very unclear 
program and organization. Nevertheless, its representatives decided to maintain such 
a program and organization and not transform the Civic Forum into a disciplined 
political party (Pehe, 1990, 15-16). In October 1990 the party elected a new chairman, 
Václav Klaus. Immediately after this, the right-leaning representatives of Civic Forum 
formed the Inter-parliamentary Club of the Democratic Right. The other left-leaning 
representatives instantly felt the need to create a counterpart to this Club, and so 
consequently the Liberal Club of Civic Forum was formed. In January 1991, Civic 
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Congress, together with the chairman Václav Klaus and his supports,  succeeded in 
passing the resolution by which the Civic Forum was transformed from a movement 
into an official political party. However, not all the members were pleased with the 
new face of Civic Forum; the Club for Socialist Restructuring and the Engaged 
Nonpartisans withdrew from the Civic Forum as they did not wish to become the 
members of Civic Forum as of a political party. The Liberal Club was also not 
delighted by the transformation of Civic Forum into a political Party, but instead of 
withdrawal, the Liberal Club decided to resist (Draper 1993).  
 
In February 1991, a special congress took place during which the Liberal Club 
declared its conversion into the Civic Movement, and proclaimed to keep the old 
loose and nonhierarchical organizational form. In the meantime, Klaus and his group 
formed the official right-of-centre political party with the name Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS) (Draper 1993; Pehe, 1991b, 15-16). The political party Civic Forum 
remained to operate as a loose umbrella of these two newly created formations, 
although the undertaken changes had weakened it. By April 1991, the federal caucus 
of the Civic Forum broke down. The Civic movement afterwards also faced 
difficulties and it proved to be a weak formation. That was proven when six of its 
deputies left the movement with the objective to join the Social Democrats (Young, 
1994).  
 
The split of VPN 
Meanwhile in Slovakia, the formation called the Public Against Violence (VPN) that 
was established in the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution also encountered problems 
to keep its full composition. The troubles arose when Vladimír Mečiar pronounced his 
motivation to become a chairman of the formation, transform VPN into a formal 
political party and highlight especially those nationalistic principles of its program. 
However, the initiative did not find the support of all the members of VPN. This 
subsequently erupted into the party’s crisis, which set forth on 3 March 1991. On 5 
March 1991 then Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar walked out of the VPN council 
meeting accompanied by fourteen other party members, informing them that they plan 
to create their own platform with the name For Democratic Slovakia (FBIS, 6 March 
1991, 29-33). The VPN crisis divided the party into two groups. On the one side a 
group led by the representative of the liberal wing Fedor Gál that comprised of 
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supporters of the original program of VPN that aimed to resolve Slovak national 
concerns within the federation. On the other side, there was a group led by Vladimír 
Mečiar that stated that Slovak concerns came before all others. On 17 March 1991 the 
party passed a vote of no confidence in Vladimir Mečiar, accusing the prime minister 
of blackmailing his opponents by using the files of the former communist police and 
of championing the separatist idea (Young, 1994). Despite the happenings, Mečiar 
expressed his reluctance to resign from the post of prime minister. Nevertheless, after 
voting, the Slovak parliament dismissed Vladimír Mečiar from his post. The post of 
Prime Minister of Slovakia was succeeded by Ján Čarnogurský. Čarnogurský was a 
chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and openly promoted the 
idea of a full independent Slovakia, but believed it would happen so only after the 
acceptance of Czechoslovakia into the European Commission. Therefore by that time 
he did not consider it as the “republic’s most pressing issue” (Rychlík, 2000, 55).  
 
On 1 May 1991 the Slovak political party VPN was officially divided into two 
formations out of which one continued to operate as VPN with its original program. 
The other one, based on Mečiar’s platform ‘For Democratic Slovakia, became a new 
political party called the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) (Rychlík, 
2000). Mečiar’s establishment of a new political party and consequential split of VPN 
was perceived by many as a major strategic move that aggravated a crisis developing 
in Slovakia. Nationalist and leftie groups showed support to Mečiar. Although their 
standpoints on how to address economic and national issues of the country diverged; 
nationalists were demanding a sovereign and independent Slovakia, Mečiar’s HZDS 
was championing for the coexistence of Czech and Slovak republics under the 
auspices of common confederation (FBIS, 11 March 1991, 22-23). Later on, Mečiar’s 
HZDS, together with the Slovak National Party SNS and the Christian Democratic 
Movement’s splinter group led by Klepáč, submitted a proposal to the Slovak national 
Council, to pass a ‘declaration on Slovak sovereignty (Rychlík, 2000; Měchýř, 1991).  
 
 
 
 
 
The split of KDH  
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The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) was yet another party to undertake 
dissolution. The faction parted over opinions regarding the country’s form. KDH’s 
nationalistically oriented group led by Ján Klepáč favored a confederal form of 
Czechoslovakia. A definite split of KDH took part on 7 March 1992 as a consequence 
of disputes over the Milovy accord. The faction officially withdrew from KDH on the 
same day and continued its existence as formal political party the Slovak Christian 
Democratic Movement (SDKH) (Rychlík, 2000). Both parties, the newly formed 
party SDKH and the remains of KDH, proclaimed to stay in the then ruling Slovakia’s 
government coalition in order to prevent governmental crisis. Under these 
circumstances, the new governmental coalition consisted of the following political 
parties; KDH, VPN, DS, MOS and became a minority government (Rychlík, 2000). 
The split of KDH was yet another factor that contributed to the alternation of a 
balance of political power in Czechoslovak society. 
 
The division of political elites  
As a result of the above-mentioned fragmentation of Czechoslovak political parties, 
the number of major political parties that the Federal Assembly composed of grew 
from 6 (in post-election 1990 period) to 12 by mid-1991 (FBIS, 14 February 1992, 6-
11), and by the time prior to the elections of 1992, there were in total 42 parties 
competing for seats (Obrman, 1992a). As shown above, the Czech, and also Slovak 
political scene was split into groups deeply divided in the opinion regarding the 
degree of Slovak autonomy. VPN and Democratic Party were advocates of a 
continuation of Czechoslovak existence as a federation, and were in the favor of only 
moderate modification of the federation (ibid.). 
 
On the other hand, KDH, HZDS and SNS proposed more extremist demands 
(Rychlík, 2000). As Young stated “Such a conflicting responses demonstrate the deep 
divisions that existed in Slovak society” (Young, 1994, 56). Another indicator of this 
division was the approval of Slovakia’s declaration of sovereignty by the Slovak 
National Council and further adoption of the new Slovak constitution on 1 September 
1992. Despite the fact that the document was passed, it had its opponents: former 
Slovak Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský and Hungarian deputies, who expressed their 
disapproval by walking out of the meeting (Young, 1994).  
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To summarize, the high level of elite accommodation is characterized by strong 
political parties, coalition formation and a willingness of elites negotiate until they 
reach an agreement. That does not inherently mean that a high level of elite 
accommodation does not allow for any existence of divergence in opinions, but it 
assumes that representatives of elites will rather opt for the continuation of 
negotiations towards a compromise rather than the fragmentation of a political party. 
The fragmentations of Czech and Slovak political parties that appeared during 1990-
1992 are yet another indicator of a low level of strength of elite accommodation in 
Czechoslovakia.  
 
3.4   The behavior and attitudes of representatives of Czechoslovak 
political elites 
 
In order to conduct a comprehensive examination of the level of the elite 
accommodation of Czechoslovak elites between 1990-1992, it is important to have a 
close look at the behavior and attitudes of these elites. The behavior and attitudes of 
politicians serves as great indicator of the level of the elite accommodation. 
Czechoslovak politicians played a main role in the process of Czechoslovak partition 
and this role was reinforced even more when it was decided to not to let the public 
express their will in the referendum. The former president of the Federation Václav 
Havel was himself realizing the power that Czechoslovak politicians held when he 
commented that it was “largely up to the politicians which social forces they choose 
to liberate and which they choose to suppress, whether they rely on the good in each 
citizen or on the bad” Havel (1993, 4). Therefore, it is greatly essential to make a 
close study of political elites and their attitudes, especially in this case; the partition of 
Czechoslovakia.  Based on the hypothesis “A Peaceful CSFR partition was facilitated 
by the high level of strong inter-elite accommodation” the expected empirical 
evidence of this part is negotiations and bargaining when it is evident that the attitude 
of politicians is directed towards a compromise, cooperation and tolerance of the 
ideas of others. However, the talks and reactions of Czechoslovak elites did not 
always prove that the cooperation and finding a solution to problems was prevailingly 
their main objective. 
Václav Havel   
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When examining Czechoslovak political elites and its representatives, we cannot 
afford to overlook the position of President Václav Havel and the impact that he had 
on the whole process of partitioning Czechoslovakia. Many times he was portrayed as 
a force for unity during the period 1990-1992. Although he did not succeed in 
preventing the partition of Czechoslovakia, he tremendously contributed in assuring 
that the partition process had a peaceful character. Together with the governmental 
and legislative leaders, Havel was the only coordinating mechanism of the talks 
regarding the constitutions and other fundamental issues, from their very beginning 
until their end (Young, 1994). As Draper put it: “(Havel) imparted to politics a moral 
dimension that commanded respect” (Draper, 1993, 20-1).  
Havel relentlessly tried to push through for the referendum on sovereignty to take 
place. He tried by all possible means to guarantee the persistence of the peace during 
the partition and tried to hamper any chances for the outbreak of violence. In order to 
strengthen the stability of peace in the country, in 1991 he gave a speech of soldiery 
in the Slovak town of Trenčín at the time when national fervor was at its peak. He 
addressed the crowd with the following words: “I would like to stress that our Army 
must not interfere or take part in this complicated process in any way, under any 
circumstances. No one must even use this option as a threat or to speculate with it… 
To play with the idea of the Army influencing internal political events is to disclaim 
all ideals of our democratic revolution and all the values in which we believe” (FBIS, 
15 March 1991, 16). The former president Václav Havel was a great figure in the 
history of Czechoslovakia not only because of his contribution to the success of the 
Velvet revolution, but just as equally because of his contribution to the partition of the 
state that helped to sustain the peace all the way through its process.  
 
In order to study the attitudes and behavior of the Czechoslovak elites at the times 
before and after the definite decision to part a federation was made, a close look at the 
negotiations and the statements of politicians made during those negotiations will be 
offered in the following section.  
 
 
 
 The frustration over constitutional issues (Time period between 1990 and elections 
1992) 
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As shown previously in the beginning of this analysis, the speed of the discussion 
concerning the constitutions of the federation, and those of the republics was rather 
slow. The tedious negotiations resulted from the opposing views of parties’ 
representatives on the fundamental issues that needed to be addressed. Additionally, 
the whole situation was even more aggravated by the fragmentation of the political 
parties and the divergence in opinions of the Slovak elites (which we have witnessed 
in the previous subchapter).  
 
Then president of federation Václav Havel described the situation about the 
complicated and dragged on bargaining between the Czechs and Slovak on the 
constitution commentating on the attitude of Slovak’s elites saying: 
“More than once I have observed work on the constitution made complicated by the 
fact that Slovak positions held yesterday are no longer held today, and no one can say 
whether positions held today will still be held tomorrow. And so proposals and 
demands that at first appeared marginal or absurd are suddenly taken seriously, and 
defended even by those who, until recently, rejected them – who now adopt them as 
their own. Unfortunately, they do so not out of conviction but for fear of appearing 
too half-hearted in their championing of Slovakia’s interests” (Havel, 1993, 3). 
According to Brown (1994), the hesitation and instability of the Slovak opinion 
“hindered settlement of outstanding constitutional differences within the union” (ibid,, 
vi). It took a really long time for Slovak elites to make a definite decision on their 
position towards whether they should leave the federation or not; exactly two years 
time, and even then not all the representatives of Slovak elites sympathized with such 
a decision.  
 
During the period of the first talks on constitution, the bargaining sides agreed on the 
establishment of the National councils, which were given rather extensive 
competencies. This agreement took place during the first half of 1990. Despite that, 
the Slovak political forces were intensifying their demands, requesting greater 
autonomy for Slovakia, and the Slovak government also supported their quest. The 
Czech and Slovak side clashed when it came to talks about the form of the state. The 
Czechoslovak elites parted in the answer to this question into two blocks; on one side 
there were Czech representatives together with pro-federalists representatives 
advocating the continuation of Czechoslovakia to exist as a federation, on the other 
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side there were Slovak political elites championing the confederal form of 
Czechoslovakia. KDH, as a political party belonging to the latter group publically 
addressed its demand for the establishment of a confederal Czechoslovakia so that 
Slovakia could enter then the European Commission “as a sovereign and equal entity” 
(Martin, 1990, 56). Czech sides opposed a confederal form of the state and further 
negotiations followed. After the chain of conducted meetings the sides finally found a 
consent regarding the division of powers. As a result of the agreement from 
Trenčianske Teplice (8-9 August 1990) decision-making power should have been 
taken from the federal government and placed into the hands of the republican 
governments by 1 January 1990. Albeit the agreement was already profusely 
decentralist, it met a rejection jointly from the Slovak Nationalist Party SNS and other 
eight smaller parties (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). While KDH spoke in support of the 
Trenčianske Teplice’s agreement, their further demands were also marked by 
nationalist and pro-sovereignty language. Then president Václav Havel blamed some 
Slovak politicians of brinkmanship and rabblerousing, pointing to the polls conducted 
that year demonstrating the wish of the populace of both republics to remain living in 
the common Czechoslovak state. He claimed, “the attempts to divide the state 
constitute a high-powered play of politicians and do not reflect the interest of ordinary 
people” (FBIS, 11 December 1990, 11). 
 
The crisis linked with the bipolarity of the elite’s interests regarding the form of the 
state, and with the expansion of demands from Slovak nationalists and radical 
political parties developed even more profoundly in the year that followed. On 7 
March 1991 the radical representatives of the nationalistic demands issued a 
Declaration of the Sovereignty of Slovakia, proposing a guideline towards the 
independence of Slovakia (Kraus & Stanger, 2000). Vladimír Mečiar, who held a post 
of prime minister back then, immediately rejected the document and henceforth 
proposed demands for Slovak sovereignty grew only stronger and were gaining more 
participants.  
 
 
 The talks on the future relations of Czechs and Slovaks (Time period after the 
elections of 1992) 
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Until the elections of 1992, the Slovak nationalist parties, above all KDH and SNS, 
were championing for the independence for Slovakia, but these demands did not 
comply with the Czech side’s vision of the Czechoslovak form of state. The situation 
turned around when the advantage shifted from the Slovak side to the hands of the 
Czech government. The change happened right after the elections of 1992 when the 
Czech government led by new Prime Minister Václav Klaus became more determined 
in its standpoint, expressing a reluctance to accept any other form of the common 
state than functional federation. Sudden intransigence of the Czech side left the newly 
elected Vladimír Mečiar in astonishment, as was evident from his interview 
conducted by French newspaper Le Monde. The head of the Slovak government 
commented on the behavior of Czech Prime Minister stating:  
“Voyez-vous, nous nous trouvons dans la situation suivante: la partie tchèque nous 
propose de constituer immédiatement deux États indépendants, sans même une 
monnaie commune. Nous, nous proposons une confederation, avec un marché 
commun, une défense commune et également en commun la protection des droits 
civiques. Mais les Tcheques ont refusé. Ils veulent un accord sur la partition avant le 
30 septembre, alors que les Slovaques, a cette date, ne veulent qu'un accord sur 
l'avenir. Les Slovaques veulent empecher la desintegration: les Tcheques proposent 
soit une federation, soit deux Etats.... 
M. Kluas ne m'a pas surpris. Ce qui m'a surpris,c'était l'aggressivité de son entourage 
qui, des la premiere rencontre a Brno, a décrété la désintegration de l'Etat au nout de 
quarante minutes de discussions. Ils ne se rendent pas compte de ce qu'ils font! Nous 
ne voulons las l'independence, on nous y pousse.” 
 “You see, we are in the following situation: the Czech side proposes to create two 
independent states immediately, without a common currency. We propose a 
confederation with a common market, a common defense and also shared protection 
of civil rights. But the Czechs refused. They want an agreement on the partition 
before September 30, while the Slovaks, by that date, do not want an agreement on 
the future of state. The Slovaks want to prevent the disintegration: the Czechs offer 
either a federation or two states .... Mr. Klaus did not surprise me. What surprised me 
was the aggressiveness of his entourage, at the first meeting in Brno, decreed the 
disintegration of the state after forty minutes of discussion. They do not realize what 
they are doing! We do not want the independence, into which they are pushing us” 
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2(Vladimír Mečiar, Interview with Le Monde, 7 July 1992, in FBIS-EEU-92-131, 8 
July 1992, p. 4).  
 
An anonymous commentator described the plight by saying that it was “as if Mečiar 
pounded at Klaus’s door without really wanting to knock it down; to Mečiar’s 
surprise, Klaus opened the door, and Mečiar fell in” (Draper 1993, 26). 
 
Klaus was highly determined to end a dysfunctional federation and he expressed his 
wish already prior to the elections, when he said that “if there won’t be a reasonable 
united state, a reasonable federation, it will be necessary to decide in a quick and 
intelligent manner on a different way” but he added “our priority is a reasonable 
common state” (NYT, 7 June 1992, L-3). In the light of these events, the Czech 
government expressed its full readiness to accept the partition of the federation, if 
necessary. Mečiar described Klaus’s rejection to his proposal of the establishment of a 
Czechoslovak confederation as a “joke” and accused him of being the first to suggest 
an option “of a single, centralist state or disintegration” which he perceived as being 
way too extreme  (FBIS, 10 June 1992, 14). 
 
On 17 June the two prime ministers met in order to bargain the future of the 
federations, but they failed to reach a compromise. Mečiar suggested a coexistence of 
the two internationally recognized republics under the auspices of a common 
confederation that he imagined as a loose defense and economic community. Klaus 
turn down this idea by labeling it a “nonstandard entity” and was asking the Slovak 
government to finally choose one of the that they had previously offered. For this 
reason Vladimír Mečiar stated that Czechs “say Slovakia has to make a unilateral step 
leading to the total disintegration” of the country, but “that is not what we want” 
(NYT 17 June 1992, L-14). 
 
At a further meeting the prime ministers would eventually agree on the creation of a 
temporary federal government. This institution would be given a prerogative power to 
solve any constitutional problems, but especially gradually prepare Czechoslovakia 
towards the partition (Obrman, 1992a). Klaus highlighted that “the federal 
                                                2	  Translated from French by Adriana Valkova  
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government understands its mandate as temporary” (NYT, 20 June 1992, L-3) and 
added that in that instant “(they) are not “pre-determining the results, our duty is to 
take part in the creation of a process which will make it possible to see this choice 
with clarity” (FBID, 22 June 1992, 20). The Czech government changed its opinion 
on the form of the state. After major talks on 19-20 June, Klaus’s ODS stated that it 
did not “consider a confederation of two republics as two subjects of international law 
to be a common state, but a union of two independent states” (FBIS, 22 June 1992, 
12). The KDS declared that they “(prefer) the constitutional separation of the current 
state to this confederation” (FTL, 22 June 1992, 1). 
 
Under these circumstances, even the president Václav Havel, that was until then a 
strong supporter of a federation adjusted his rhetoric and commented on the then 
events with following words:  
 “I share the view that the stake of uncertainty cannot be prolonged forever and the 
sooner the decision is taken the better. Every day of delay increases the unfortunate 
consequences of uncertainty – moral, economic, international-legal, and political. The 
very agony of the common state, its gradual collapse, or an unruly break-up would 
turn against all citizens” (Keesing’s, June 1992, 38945). But at the same time the 
president insisted that the people should be given a right to choose the fate of their 
country in referendum. Additionally, he declared his intentions to run on the 
presidential elections 1992. His intentions to be reelected as president were hampered 
by Mečiar’s HZDS and the former communist party, as the Slovak deputies did not 
support him. Klaus pinpointed the fact that Václav Havel was elected only by Czech 
deputies as “yet another step casting doubt on the common state” (Obrman, 1992b, 3). 
With this in mind, Václav Havel tried to warn the public from the irresponsible 
politicians and encouraged the citizens to avoid giving their vote to “people for whom 
power is more important than the fate of the nation, people who hide conceit and 
pride behind their indulgent smile, people who are not able to listen to others but are 
full only of their own importance” (NYT, 6 June, 1992, 3). 
 
In the final analysis of this subchapter, from the mentioned above we can derive that 
the attitudes and behavior of the representatives of both, Czech and Slovak elites, 
were vastly marked by a unwillingness to compromise. The biggest indicator of this is 
the fact that they had failed to produce a consensus on the form of the state that 
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consequently led towards the partition of the country. The above quotations also 
manifest the adverse behavior between the leaders and that is certainly not a sign of 
the cooperation. Thereupon we can derive from the collected data that the level of the 
elite accommodation was low.  
 
3.5   The reaction of the predecessor state 
 
In the previous subchapters in order to test the hypothesis A peaceful Czechoslovak 
partition was facilitated by the high level of strong elite accommodation the following 
the tested indicators; the pace of the negotiations, the willingness to compromise, the 
fragmentations of the political parties and the attitudes and behavior of elites 
disproved the hypothesis. Because the peace during the Czechoslovak partition was 
maintained, based on the hypothesis, it was expected to find out from the study that 
the level of the elite accommodation was high. However, the analyzed indicators 
demonstrated that the pace of the negotiations was lengthy and tedious, the 
negotiations to meet a compromise were complex, the willingness to compromise was 
low, there was a fragmentation of the main political parties and the existence of the 
adverse behavior and attitude of intransigence. These all are the characteristic signs of 
weak and low level of the elite accommodation. Therefore this leads us to ask the 
question (as elites played the main role during the partition process), how was it 
possible that peace was maintained if the level of elite accommodation was low?  
What was the necessary factor that helped maintain the peace during the partition of 
Czechoslovakia?  
 
The answer is the reaction of the predecessor state (Czechoslovakia) on the Slovak 
national demands. The realization of the pro-federalist and the Czech side was that it 
was impossible to reach a consensus on the fundamental issues without which the 
continuation of existence of federation was not possible. As Václav Havel, pro-
federalist and representative of Czech elite, described it “we came to realize that the 
Slovaks had the right to independence” (Havel, 2000, ix). And they were willing to let 
Slovaks enjoy that right.  
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The former president Václav Havel himself played an important role during the 
negotiations from the very beginning all the way until the decision to cease the 
country’s existence was made. He was one of the majors ‘coordinating mechanisms 
that helped to solidarize the Czech elites as well as the public. He tirelessly tried to 
push through the referendum at each crisis, although unsuccessfully.  
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Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to contribute to the explanation of the peaceful 
partition of Czechoslovakia that took place in 1993. This task was undertaken through 
the study of what impact Czechoslovak political elites - in particular, the level of their 
elite accommodation – had on peace maintenance during the partition process of the 
country. The theory introduced by James and Carment suggests that the weak inter-
elite accommodation, or nonexistent accommodation in the society is a necessary 
factor that increases the chance for escalation of an ethnic conflict. Assuming that the 
definition of peace inherently means the absence of violence, I derived my hypothesis 
accordingly; the peaceful Czechoslovak partition was facilitated by the high level of 
strong elite accommodation. However, it is important to highlight that the level of 
elite accommodation is considered a complementary factor that increases the chances 
for peace maintenance during the state partition. As there were another crucial factors 
that added to the odds of maintaining the peace during this particular partition; the 
history of good relations, clear demographic and geographical division and the 
external factors like for instance the then ongoing bloodshed in the ethnic conflict in 
Yugoslavia, after which created an awareness of what can kind of disaster a ethnic 
conflict can create, and so Czech and Slovak elites were motivated to prevent it. 
Therefore by my study I aimed to contribute to the other factors.   
 
In order to test this hypothesis I examined the following indicators of the level of elite 
accommodation; the pace of the negotiations; the willingness to compromise; the 
presence of fragmentation of political parties; and the behavior and attitudes of 
representatives of political elites. However the main finding gathered after the 
research and analysis implied that the level of accommodation of Czechoslovak elites 
during 1990-1992 was low. This was concluded after gathered evidence, which 
manifested that the pace of the negotiations was slow, discussion were protracted and 
oftentimes complicated especially by Slovak elite, especially by its nationalist 
factions. The events also indicated that the elites were unwilling to compromise, 
especially on crucial issues. Another factor that indicated a low level of 
accommodation of Czechoslovak elites was the fragmentation of the main political 
parties that appeared during 1990-1992. That manifests the division of opinion and 
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intransigence even within political elites of each nation. The last analyzed indicator of 
a weak level of accommodation in Czechoslovakia was an antagonistic behavior and 
attitude between the Czech and Slovak elites that accompanied the talks.  
 
To conclude, as the peace during the process of partition of Czechoslovakia was 
maintained despite the fact that the level of its elite accommodation was low, the 
tested hypothesis was disproved. However it is important to state here that the 
unwillingness to compromise was more characteristic of the Slovak elites than of the 
Czech, at least until the elections of 1992. Until the elections of 1992, Czechs elites 
were inclined to accommodative behavior. After the elections, the leadership of the 
both republics changed and the new presidium of the Czech government was more 
intransigence than its predecessor. Their new leader Václav Klaus was not willing to 
drag the negotiations any further, especially after he saw that it was impossible to find 
consent on the fundamental issues; the form of the country and the future relationship 
of the nations. His main concern was the negative impact of protracted and inefficient 
debates on the economy of the country. With the objective to finally terminate the 
disputes, he proposed two possible solutions with which he was willing to agree; to 
continue the common cohabitation under the auspices of federation, or to cease the 
existence of the republic. The Slovak elites were divided into two groups regarding 
the opinion on what should be the future form of the country.  The Prime Minister, 
Vladimír Mečiar, and his supporters advocated the loose and decentralist 
confederation, and the other group led by nationalists championed the idea of a 
sovereign and independent Slovakia. As Mečiar’s proposal of confederation was not 
acceptable for Klaus, he upheld the will of the Slovak nationalists for a sovereign 
Slovakia. Ultimately, the two leaders agreed to dissolve the country by the end of 
1992. Therefore the alternative explanation of how the peace was maintained even 
though the level of elite accommodation was low can be that it is satisfactory for the 
peace to be maintained if only one of the bargaining sides is accommodative, and 
ultimately gives up to the demands of the other side.  
 
I focused in my study at the level of elites accommodation, as on the complementary 
factor of the peaceful partition in Czechoslovakia. However, I believe that the 
important factor that helped to maintain the peace was also the fact that the people of 
the republics did not rebel against the decision of the state to dissolve the country, 
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despite the fact that polls conducted in 1990-1992 showed that they did not agree with 
the partition. As violence does not always come from the state but can also be 
initiated by the people, it is important to study the political behavior of elites in 
connection with the peaceful partition. It is striking that the Czechs and Slovaks did 
not rise up against the state, even after the right to express their wish and determine 
the fate of their state through the referenda was taken away from them. The questions 
that rises here is therefore “why the people did not rebel, but remained silent, 
remained peaceful?” Is it rooted in their political culture or was it simply just 
indifference? The limitation of my study is that I neglected this factor, which was due 
to the volume constrains of the thesis. But I believe that the study of the political 
culture of the Czechoslovak public as a complementary factor that helped to maintain 
the peace would be fruitful as it would positively contribute not only to the study of 
peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia, but also to the studies of peaceful partitions in 
general and it would maybe help to facilitate the peace during future partitions.  
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